In recent years growing competition in the microfinance industry has been censured for multiple borrowing, default crises, high interest rates and coercive recovery of loans. Using the Boone indicator as a measure for competition, our paper investigates the impact of competition on microfinance institutions' (MFIs) outreach, financial performance and quality of loan portfolio. We deal with the potential endogeneity issues by employing the instrumental variable approach using the generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimation technique. Analysing the Microfinance Information Exchange data our empirical results show that increased competition in microfinance sector leads to a larger average loans and a decrease in the financial self-sustainability. The data also supports the view that increased competition in the microfinance industry leads to a decline in the loan portfolio quality.
Introduction
By definition, in a competitive setting more firms compete for a limited market share.
Particularly in the financial sector such a setting is vitally important for a number of reasons.
First, the degree of competitiveness matters for the productive efficiency of financial services and the quality, diversity and innovativeness of financial products. Second, specific to the financial sector, competition greatly affects the financial stability of an organization (Claessens, 2009 ). Third, competition significantly affects firms' and households' access to financial services, which, in turn, may impact the consumers' wealth and economic growth and social welfare in general. Particularly in the loan markets, competition may push down loan prices and improve services for consumers and enterprises (Cetorelli, 2001; Bikker et al., 2007; Leuvensteijn et al., 2011; Tabak et al., 2012) .
The microfinance industry has experienced a tremendous growth during the last few decades.
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are quasi-banks which provide specialized financial services, primarily to poor women, in developing countries. Subsidized funding from governments, development agencies and commercially oriented funders including commercial banks are the key drivers of growth in microfinance operations (Assefa et al., 2013; Ghosh and Van Tassel, 2011) . Such rapid growth has induced increased competition among the MFIs, which has been blamed for multiple borrowing and a growing repayment crisis. Using country-level panel datasets compiled from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) database, we employ the generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimation technique to investigate the impact of competition on microfinance institutions' (MFIs) outreach, financial performance and quality of loan portfolio.
Increased competition impacts the microfinance industry and clients in several ways. First, it weakens the functioning of the dynamic incentive mechanism used by MFIs and leads to higher loan default. Second, increased competition leads to a decline in the borrower quality as better performing clients move to profit-oriented MFIs. Third, interest rates may drop as competition increases, which may lead to a decline in MFIs' profitability and they may not cross-subsidize less-profitable projects (McIntosh and Wydick, 2005) . The clustering effect may result in profit-motivated MFIs entering the markets where the penetration of the preexisting socially-motivated MFIs is high. Profit maximizing MFIs select their clients from the already-trained and screened set of clients of the socially-motivated MFIs, which adversely impacts socially-motivated MFIs' outreach performance. Loan repayment problems coupled with increased competition and information asymmetry may also lead to a decline in portfolio quality (Broecker, 1990) ; Marquez, 2002) and expose the MFI clients to the risk of overindebtedness and debt-traps leading to increased sociological and psychological constraints (Schicks and Rosenberg 2011) .
We measure competition using Boone indicator or the 'profit elasticity' (PE) indicator, which is based on the Relative Profit Differences (RPD) concept, where competition rewards efficiency (Boone, 2008; Leuvensteijn et al., 2011) . The underlying intuition is that in a more competitive market, firms are punished more harshly (in terms of profits) for being inefficient.
The PE indicator is robust from both a theoretical and an empirical point of view when compared with more conventional measures of competition like Learner's index, Panzar- Rosse H-statistic and the HHI (Boone et al., 2007) . Thus, we later argue in the paper that these measures of competition may not assess existing competition scenarios in microfinance appropriately.
Amidst anecdotal speculation, the empirical evidence on competition in microfinance is scant.
The paper attempts to fill this gap and contributes on several levels. First, though the Boone indicator has been employed for measuring competition in the banking sector (see, for example, Schaeck and Cihák, 2010; Boone and Leuvensteijn, 2010; Leuvensteijin et al. 2011 ), it has not been used before to estimate competition in the microfinance sector. Employing the Boone indicator enables us to move beyond proxying competition with concentration ratios like HHI and Lerner's index. (as previously used in other studies, for instance, Assefa et al. 2013 , Baquero et al. 2012 . Second, we also deal with the issue of potential endogeneity of MFI performance, competition measure and other covariates using instrumental variables generalized method of moments (IV-GMM) estimation approach. Third, the analysis is based on country-level panel datasets that combine three databases. The Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) database provides the outreach, portfolio and balance sheet information on 521 individual MFIs. Additional data on institutional governance quality and macroeconomic and financial development were collected respectively from the World Governance Indicators and the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Necessary adjustments have been made to guarantee consistency and comparability between these three data sets.
Our empirical results suggest that increased competition leads to an increase in average loan size (adjusted) which implies a movement away from the poor or worsened depth of outreach.
Several researchers and practitioners have expressed concern about increased competition especially through the entry of commercial banks into the Microfinance Industry. We also find that increased competition leads to a decline in the financial self-sustainability.
Validating concerns and criticisms of increased competition, we find that increase in competition does in fact lead to a decline in the loan portfolio quality.
Subsequent sections discuss the relevant literature (section 2) and the various measures of competition (section 3). Section 4 presents the methodology with the estimation of our competition measures and the econometric specification. The data and the variables are present in section 5 with the discussion of the empirical results in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes.
Competition in Microfinance
Increased competition amongst the MFIs is the outcome of at least two recent developments in this sector. First, for the last couple of years the industry has grown very rapidly with greater diversification of funding sources and entry of commercial banks and funders that are profit oriented. Second, the number of for-profit commercial microfinance service providers has also increased. These MFIs attempt to achieve financial self-sufficiency while keeping their social mission intact. Arguably balancing the social objectives and financial self-reliance has been challenging for the microfinance sector.
Increased competition seemed problematic for the microfinance sectors in many countries. In order to discipline their clients and ensure timely repayments most MFIs use 'dynamic incentives' that links future access to credit with proper repayments of earlier loans. With increased competition, asymmetric information problems on clients' profile escalate. As increased number of MFIs compete for the same set of clients, instances of multiple loans or 'double dipping' by borrowers rise. The asymmetric information in the multi-lender market deteriorates the portfolio quality (Broecker, 1990; Marquez, 2002) . Moreover, the excessive total debt due to multiple loans, can potentially lead to a further deterioration in the total default rates of MFIs, thereby rendering the dynamic incentives mechanism dysfunctional (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998) .
Increased competition due to the entry of profit-oriented MFIs induces the profitable clients of the socially-motivated MFIs to shift to the MFIs that lend larger loans and have higher net returns. This thereby worsens the quality of the loan portfolio of the socially-motivated MFIs and negatively impacts these MFIs' cross-subsidisation possibilities 1 (Navajas et al., 2003; McIntosh and Wydick, 2005) . Thus, increased competition leads to the risk of overindebtedness and debt-traps with increased sociological and psychological constraints as stated before (Schicks and Rosenberg, 2011) .
Competition also affects the consumers' wealth and the performance and financial soundness of financial service providers (Bikker and Bos, 2005) . It has a negative impact on outreach (Assefa et al., 2013) and affects the product quality, product diversity and productive efficiency of financial institutions (Claessens and Laeven, 2004) . Cull et al. (2009a) argue that rising competition leads to market saturation in some countries. Using a concentration index and mainly focusing on depth of outreach, Olivares-Polanco (2005) finds that increased competition results in lower outreach. While the results remain inconclusive, she argues that the probability of default is higher with increased levels of indebtedness. Baquero et al. (2012) finds that for-profit MFIs charge significantly lower loan rates and demonstrate better portfolio quality in less concentrated markets. Non-profit MFIs, however, are comparatively insensitive to changes in concentration. Assefa et al. (2013) argue that intense competition is negatively associated with MFI performance as measured by outreach, profitability, efficiency and loan repayment rates. In saturated markets, MFIs try to decrease their costs by lowering lending standards or decreasing screening efforts thus leading to higher loan default rates due to the increase of risky borrowers. Over-aggressive marketing (pressuring borrowers to take new loan after they have just paid off an old one) adds to the risk and may trigger the risk of over-indebtedness. 'Over-confidentiality bias' or a 'hyperbolic discounting', that is, discounting the future too strongly and putting too much weight on the present, can also lead the borrowers to make bad decisions like taking more debt (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979) . Schicks and Rosenberg (2011) suggest that the use of over-aggressive collection practices and inflexible loan products may cause borrower over-indebtedness. They argue that these problems are further aggravated by bad staffs that encourage over-lending, offer wrong products, obscures loan terms and use abusive collection practices.
1 Cross-subsidisation means reaching out to the unreached wealthier clients in order to finance a large number of poor clients with relatively small average loan size (Kar and Bali Swain 2013). Hermes et al. (2008) analyse the impact of formal financial development on microfinance efficiency. They argue that in a formal market set up the efficiency of MFIs improves due to competitive pressure. In a related paper, Cull et al. (2009b) claim that MFIs faced with high competition from formal banks tend to reduce their breadth of outreach but focus more on the depth of outreach. However, they found that the effects on other performance indicators, such as profitability, are weak. Both Hermes et al. (2008) and Cull et al. (2009b) , however, use country-level measures of competition, rather than measures reflecting competition at the institutional level.
Thus, we see from the above discussion that the impact of competition on the financial and social performance of MFIs remains grossly understudied. Although a few studies have attempted to explore these issues, they have some limitations, especially in terms of employing an appropriate tool for competition measurement. This paper aims to overcome this and adds to the empirical literature on microfinance performance and competition, and improves on the measurement of competition by using the Boone indicator, a recently developed measure of competition in the banking literature.
Measures of competition
Estimating the degree of competition in any industry is a challenging task and the banking industry is not an exception. Several methods have been developed for measuring bank competition and they can be broadly divided into two major approaches: the Structural, or the Industrial Organization (IO) approach and the Non-Structural, or the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO), approach. The Structural method, originates from the industrial organisation theory that tests the market structure to assess the bank competition based on the Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) model. This method uses the number of banks or the degree of banking industry concentration as a proxy for market power. The SCP hypothesis argues that greater concentration causes less competitive conducts and leads to greater profitability of the bank. In this model, competition is measured by concentration indices such as the n-firm concentration ratios or the Herfindahl-Hirschman index Some papers test this model jointly with an alternative explanation of performance, namely the efficiency hypothesis, which attributes differences in performance (or profit) to differences in efficiency ( for example, Goldberg and Rai, 1996) .
Nevertheless, the Structural approach has several deficiencies (Hannan, 1991) . Although these hypotheses have frequently been employed in empirical research, they are not always supported by theoretical microeconomic theory (Delis et al., 2008; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Bikker and Spierdijk, 2008) . As a result, recent studies have increasingly relied on the NEIO approach to draw inferences on firms' observed behaviour from the estimated parameters derived from theoretical microeconomic models of price and output determination (Lau, 1982; Bresnahan, 1982; Panzar and Rosse, 1987; Carbo et al., 2009) Banks' efficiency is frequently used as a proxy for competition. The intuition is that strong competition reduces banks' unused scale economies. Thus, existence of non-exhausted scale economies indicates that there is scope for reducing costs, which indirectly indicates competition or a lack of it (Bikker and Leuvensteijn, 2008) . Based on these views the X-efficiency literature is focused on the managerial ability to reduce production costs (Leuvensteijn et al., 2011) . Another view suggests that high profits may indicate lack of competition. So, market power may also be related to profitability in the sense that profitability is measured as a ratio of price-cost margin (PCM) and the output price. PCM is frequently used to estimate the Lerner index in the empirical IO literature.
Methodology

Measuring competition: The Boone indicator model
In this paper we use the Boone indicator as the measure of competition. The Boone (2008) model considers the impact of efficiency on performance in terms of profits and market shares. It centres on the idea that the more efficient firms (firms with lower marginal costs) gain higher market shares or profits. 3 The higher the degree of competition in the market the stronger the impact and the more negative the indicator. Intuitively it implies that competition improves the performance of efficient firms, but it weakens the inefficient firms'
performance. The Boone model has several advantages. First, in this model products are assumed close substitutes with no or low entry costs. This is an advantage over the concentration measures and some other competition proxies. Second, using the Boone indicator, it is possible to measure competition for several specific product markets and also different categories of financial institutions. Third, the conventional measures such as the Lerner index and the H-statistics may lead to flawed results especially due to interest rate regulations applicable to most microfinance industries. Fourth, while other measures consider the entire industry, the Boone indicator can measure competition of microfinance market segments, such as the loan market only. Following Schaeck and Cihak (2010) , the following model defines the Boone indicator:
where π it stands for profit of MFI i at year t, MC is the marginal costs of MFI i at year t, β denotes the Boone indicator, d t is the time dummy and μ it is the time-dependent idiosyncratic error term. The above specification evaluates the competitive conditions for each microfinance sector for each country included in the dataset for the entire period. We add the time dummies to control for temporal evolution of the profits within a country. We expect that MFIs with low marginal costs make higher profits, i.e. β < 0. Competition tends to increase this effect, since more efficient MFIs outperform less efficient ones. The more negative β is, the higher is the competition level in a market. Positive values for β suggest that higher the marginal costs of the bank, the more profits it will earn (Leuvensteijin et al., 2011 ) signifying the presence of extreme level of collusion or competition on quality (Tabak et al., 2012 ).
The Boone model also provides the yearly estimates of competition to enable examination of the historic evolution of competition. The yearly Boone scores are estimated using the following equation where the individual time dummies are to capture the year-specific factors common to all MFIs in the market:
We use return on assets (ROA) as the proxy for profits following Leuvensteijn et al (2011) . 4 The marginal cost (MC it ) for each MFI and year in the database is estimated using a separate translog cost function (TCF) as marginal costs are not observed directly 5 . The translog cost function includes one output and three input prices: price of labour, price of funds and price of capital. The gross loan portfolio is used as a proxy for output. The input prices are proxied by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets (price of labour), the ratio of financial expenses to total assets 6 (price of funds) and the ratio of administrative expenses to total assets (price of capital). We impose symmetry and linear homogeneity restrictions on the input prices which mean that costs increase (decrease) by the same proportion as the input prices increase (decrease). Hence, intuitively, total costs represent the three inputs included in the cost function. The TCF is specified as follows:
where TC it stands for total costs (captured by the total expenditures over assets ratio) of MFI i at year t 7 , q it represents output of MFI i at year t captured by the gross loan portfolio, W denotes the three input prices and ε it is an error term. Time dummies (d t ) for each year are also included to capture the technological progress over time.
Previous studies (see, for instance, Leuvensteijn et al., 2011) have employed the ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the parameters of the cost function. However, employing OLS has several limitations and produces biased parameter estimates resulting from the multicollinearity problem since the TCF includes a large number of explanatory variables.
Recently, stochastic frontier (SF) models have become a popular tool for efficiency analysis.
Theoretical motivation for the SF model is that no economic agent can exceed the ideal "frontier" and the deviations from this extreme represent the individual inefficiencies. The parametric SF models are a regression model (estimated by likelihood-based methods) with a composite error term that includes the classical idiosyncratic disturbance and a one-sided disturbance which represents inefficiency (Belotti et al., 2012) . As an alternative to the SF model data envelopment analysis (DEA) is also sometimes used, which makes general production and distribution assumptions. However, if the assumptions are weak and invalid, inefficiency levels may be systematically underestimated in small samples and inconsistency may arise with a bias over the frontier. Thus, this paper uses a parametric SF model to estimate the translog cost function. We use the specification of the TCF (equation 3) in logarithmic form as it allows the interpretation of first-order coefficients as cost elasticities.
The marginal cost of MFI i at year t can then be obtained from the first derivative of equation (3) as follows:
Leuvensteijin et al. (2011) and Schaeck and Cihak (2010) suggest potential endogeneity problems (discussed in the next sub-section) in the estimation of equations (1) and (2) within estimator) as using IV estimates with GMM technique in unjustified then. The marginal costs are computed by substituting parameter estimates from TCF into equation (4).
Model Specification
To evaluate the effect of competition on the performance indicators of microfinance institutions, we estimate the following model:
Y ijt = α´C ijt + β´X it + δ´Z jt + e t + u i + ε it i = 1,2,…, N; t = 1,2,…, T
Where Y ijt represents the performance indicators (proxied by depth of outreach (social performance) and loan portfolio quality of MFI i at time t located in country j). C ijt is a (1 × k)
vector of measures of competition that varies over individual MFIs, time and country; X it is a
(1 × k) vector of time-varying observed MFI characteristics that vary over both individual
MFIs and time; Z jt is a (1 × p) vector of macroeconomic and overall governance indicators that varies over both countries and time. All of these variables are assumed to influence outreach, performance and loan portfolio quality (i.e., repayment status) of individual MFIs.
The time-specific individual effect e t is distributed independently across time with variance σ 2 e ; u i is the MFI-specific individual effect and is assumed to be an unobserved time-invariant random variable distributed independently across MFIs with variance σ 2 u ; and ε it is the usual (idiosyncratic) error term, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the vector columns (C, X, Z, u) and has a zero mean and constant variance σ 2 ε conditional on C ijt , X it and Z jt . Together, v it = e t + u i + ε it is commonly referred to as the composite error term where e t is the timevarying unobservable time-specific effect, u i is the time-invariant unobservable individualspecific effect and ε it is the remainder disturbance term.
First, we perform a joint F-test to check poolability following Baltagi (2008) , which reveals that both individual and time effects are statistically significant at 1% level. This rejects the homogeneity assumption across MFIs and time and indicates that panel data estimations should be employed. However, an additional difficulty in estimating the model is that the measures of financial performance, depth of outreach and loan portfolio quality of MFIs can be simultaneously determined by unobservable managerial competence or aptitude.
Endogeneity may arise due to other reasons too. For example, financial self-sufficiency (FSS) and return on assets (ROA) are the common measures of financial performance of MFIs.
These ratios are determined by financial revenue which consists of interest rate and fees components. For instance, FSS is determined by the ratio of financial revenue to the sum of financial expense, loan loss provision expense and operating expense. Covariates like portfolio yield, which is the proxy for interest rates is also defined as a ratio of interest (and fees) on loan portfolio and gross loan portfolio. Thus, endogeneity comes from the uncontrolled confounding variable-interest and fees-as it is an extraneous variable which correlates with both the dependent and the independent variable. Again, for the relation between loan portfolio quality and portfolio yield, reverse causality (another source of endogeneity) is at work, since it is unclear whether loan delinquency rates are affected by portfolio yield or vice versa.
Endogeneity weighs down the estimates with inconsistency and inefficiency. We employ the instrumental variables (IV) estimations to deal with this. Baltagi (2008) suggests that IV estimations can take care of the potential problems associated with outliers with bad leverage and weak instruments in unbalanced panel data. We employ one-and two-step GMM estimators since they are robust to violations of homoscedasticity and normality. Since we have large N and small T panels, the GMM estimator takes care of arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial dependence problems using the optimal weighting matrix (Wooldridge 2002). The endogeneity bias is overcome finding a set of relevant instruments independent of the error term. We need at least as many instruments (L) as regressors (K). So, the lagged explanatory variables have been used as the instruments. Since L > K, we have a set of over-identifying restrictions. The instruments' independence from the error term is then tested with Hansen's (1982) J-test which is distributed as chi 2 with (L -K) degrees of freedom. A high value of chi 2 (and very low p-value) indicates that some of the instruments are still correlated with the error term, and therefore, the endogeneity problem persists.
As the analysis in this paper uses MFI-specific and country-level yearly data, MFI-level fixed effects (FE) are most likely to capture the differences in individual data, and therefore, estimations through the fixed effects (FE) models of (5) are quite justified. We include individual effects and time effects to capture MFI-specific and time-specific effects. To test the robustness of the results fixed-effects 2SLS (FE2SLS), error components 2SLS (EC2SLS) and LIML (limited information maximum likelihood) estimations were also performed and the results remained largely unperturbed.
Data and variables
The analysis in this paper is based on the MFI-level data that were obtained from individual number of observations by country and year. Details on the number of observations by country and MFI legal types are presented in Table 2 .
This set of countries has differences in their regulatory frameworks and revenue streams.
However, when we employ the Boone indicator to measure competition, differences in country-specific revenue sources do not matter significantly. Thus we can compare the revenue stream of a 'micro-saving' centric country (Indonesia), for instance, with that of a 'microloan' centric country (India). Our data includes countries where the microfinance 
Discussion on empirical results
Boone coefficient scores
To estimate the Boone indicator we need to estimate the marginal costs for each MFI and year in our data. However, since marginal costs are not directly observed, it is estimated using a separate translog cost function. Table 5 presents the mean and standard deviations of the MFIlevel input price and output variables used in the translog cost specification by country.
Evidently, MFIs from Bangladesh, Bolivia, Mexico and Peru generally have the largest loan portfolios. On the contrary, gross loan portfolios in Nepal and Philippines are the lowest.
Administrative expenses in terms of total assets are comparatively high in Latin American countries, especially in Mexico (around 15%) and Nicaragua (around 9%). In Bangladesh, India and Nepal administrative expenses are relatively low (ranging between 2% to 5% only).
Financial expenses for the MFIs in Nepal and Bangladesh are among the lowest (2.5% and 3.8% respectively). These expenses are more-or-less similar in three Latin American countries: Peru, Nicaragua and Mexico (around 6%). In terms of personnel expenses, Mexico Indonesia instead show a tendency to collude in certain years. Table 8 presents the crosscorrelations between our main independent variables used in the econometric model along with their corresponding significance levels.
Competition and MFI-performance analysis
The results of the effect of competition on performance outcome in terms of outreach, In Table 9 , we measure MFIs' depth of outreach with the average loan size adjusted by GNI per capita and percentage of female borrowers. As mentioned earlier, higher negative values of the Boone indicator indicate increased competition. Results in Table 9 (dependent variable: percent of female borrowers) shows that the coefficients of the Boone indicator variable in columns 1-3 are negative, but statistically insignificant. However, the results for the adjusted average loan size are negative and highly significant except for model 3. The increased market power enables the MFIs to maintain cautious lending operations through smaller loans. It may therefore be possible for them to earn some returns to become self-sufficient. An increase in the real portfolio yields therefore helps to improve the MFIs' self-sustainability. The focus on lending also shows similar results. MFI-size variable is always positive and highly significant meaning that bigger MFIs perform better financially and hence, become self-reliant. The coefficient of the age variable is always positive, but rarely significant statistically. This suggests that as MFIs age they perform well financially.
The coefficients of the regulatory quality variable are negative and highly significant. This is suggestive of the fact that quality of regulation is now very important and with its better functionality the sampled MFIs may not achieve higher financial performance. Again, an improved state of rule of law just helps in ensuring MFIs' better financial performance. Table 11 presents the results of the link between competition and quality of loan portfolio. In the analysis, we use two measures of nonperforming loans (NPLs) in terms of gross loan portfolio as the proxies for loan portfolio risk: Portfolios-at-risk past 30 days (PAR30) and portfolios-at-risk past 90 days (PAR90). The Boone indicator coefficients are mostly negative and highly significant. Our empirical results indicate that as the Boone indicator becomes more negative (increased competition) MFIs' are confronted with increase in loan portfolio risk. High default in MFIs implies low loan portfolio quality. As documented for several MFIs, increased competition may lead to dual or multiple borrowing resulting in heavy debt burden for the borrowers. Some borrowers also get into the cycle of repaying old loans with new ones. Such measures result in unhealthy borrowing and lead to a decline in loan portfolio quality. This supports the researchers and practitioners that have cautioned against indiscriminate lending with increased competition that may lead to default crisis and coercive recovery of loans. Among the control variables, we also find that for older MFIs repayment performance is better and such performance has an increasing trend (as the coefficients of the age 2 variables are positive significant at least in two models). However, MFI-size does not matter much for NPLs. Therefore, it may not be the case that larger MFIs have a better loan portfolio quality or better monitoring capability than the smaller ones. We also find that as rural population grow NPLs also grow. One plausible explanation for this is that with increased rural population, MFIs may not apply better screening and cautious lending methods. As a result, NPLs increase.
Conclusions
As the microfinance Industry scales up to reach larger number of clients, entry of new MFIs is leading to increased competition. The paper aims at determining the impact of competition on MFIs' depth of outreach, financial performance and quality of loan portfolio. Only a handful of previous studies have explored these issues. Among them, for instance, Assefa et al. (2013) have used the Lerner's index as a measure of competition without taking into consideration of endogeneity of performance and competition. We employ a new and relatively advanced technique of competition measurement in the microfinance industry, the Boone indicator.
The existing endogeniety issues in the estimation are also accounted for. We first estimate the indicator from translog cost function through stochastic frontier analysis and then regress this Employing GMM estimation technique our results suggest that competition among MFIs is actually not bad as it improves their performance (social and financial) and loan portfolio quality. Although social performance seems to have declined as average loan size increases, the effect of competition on female participation remains statistically insignificant.
Our results confirm that competition in the microfinance industry might lead to a negative impact on MFIs performance and portfolio quality. The concerns regarding increased competition leading to multiple borrowing, default crisis, high interest rates and coercive recovery of loans may have some substance. However, these negative effects of increased competition may be minimized through improved regulatory measures. As previous studies suggest, sharing information among the MFIs may also potentially contribute to lower delinquency rates as well as prevent borrowers from taking multiple loans and getting into debt traps.
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